An Economic Analysis of Consumer Learning for Online Entertainment Shopping by LI, Jin et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
6-2016
An Economic Analysis of Consumer Learning for
Online Entertainment Shopping
Jin LI
Zhiling GUO
Singapore Management University, ZHILINGGUO@smu.edu.sg
Geoffrey K.F. TSO
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LI, Jin; Zhiling GUO; and TSO, Geoffrey K.F.. An Economic Analysis of Consumer Learning for Online Entertainment Shopping.
(2016). Proceedings of the 20th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS). 1-14. Research Collection School Of
Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3429
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER LEARNING FOR 
ONLINE ENTERTAINMENT SHOPPING 
Jin Li, School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China, 
jinli@xidian.edu.cn 
Zhiling Guo, School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore, 
zhilingguo@smu.edu.sg 
Geoffrey K. F. Tso, College of Business, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 
msgtso@cityu.edu.hk 
Abstract 
Entertainment shopping supported by pay-to-bid auction is an emerging online business model in 
recent years. Consumers expect both entertainment value and monetary return from their 
participation in entertainment shopping. We propose a dynamic structural model to study consumers’ 
online shopping behavior. We analyze the learning process of consumers from two perspectives based 
on the Bayesian updating framework: (1) consumers update their beliefs about the entertainment 
value through their repeated personal participation experiences, and (2) consumers infer the expected 
monetary payoffs on the website by observing the publically available auction ending price 
information. We estimate the model using a large dataset from an entertainment shopping website. 
The results show that consumers generally show risk-seeking preferences. They significantly 
overestimate the entertainment value but underestimate the level of competition at the beginning of 
their participation, which helps to explain the observed decreasing participation rate over time. 
Through counterfactual policy simulations, we discuss the website design implications and 
recommend strategies to create a sustainable business model. 
 
Keywords: E-Commerce, Entertainment Shopping, Dynamic Structural Model, Consumer Learning, 
Bayesian Statistics. 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of e-commerce has inspired many new forms of online selling mechanisms. For 
example, Madbid.com, claimed as the number one fun shopping website, is a fast-growing 
entertainment shopping site that has attracted over 1 million users over Europe and across the world. 
Other well-known websites, such as DealDash.com, Bidcactus.com and QuiBids.com, sell goods using 
a similar mechanism called penny auction. Penny auction, also known as pay-to-bid auction or bidding 
fee auction, is a special form of all-pay auction which requires all participants to pay a non-refundable 
bidding fee to place each small incremental bid. Economists have suggested that all-pay auction can 
generate greater revenue than the standard auctions such as those used by eBay, representing a 3 
billion industry today (Easley et al. 2011; Krishna and Morgan 1997). Despite the great promise, many 
of the new sites, such as Swoopo.com and BigDeal.com, have failed after a short period of operation. 
Decreasing consumer confidence leads to decline in the overall growth of the industry, casting doubts 
about whether entertainment shopping represents a sustainable business model. 
Pay-to-bid auction differs from the traditional auction in several ways. In traditional auctions, if a 
bidder wins, he gets the product with a price close to its market value; if the bidder loses, it does not 
cost him anything. In pay-to-bid auction, if a bidder wins, he can achieve huge savings; if the bidder 
loses, he gets nothing after spending a lot of money in bids. The auctioneer collects revenue from the 
bidding fees paid by all participants. The huge revenue potential for the auctioneer and the high return 
for the winner have great appeal for both entrepreneurial start-ups and consumers. 
Because it is possible that consumers pay a large amount of bidding fees and still lose an auction, 
some analysts have criticized the business model as a type of gambling, similar to lotteries. However, 
the industry defends itself differently and brands itself as entertainment shopping. The selling 
mechanism turns shopping into a competitive bidding game, while the winning bidders get the 
merchandise with substantial savings and all losing bidders get exciting experiences, which may worth 
the bidding fees they pay in the auction games. Proponents view it as a “game of skill” that “allows the 
most skilful to get amazing bargains.” 
The above debate motivates us to look at the business model from the lens of participating consumers. 
First, we are interested in understanding consumers’ participation incentives. What major motivations 
attract consumers to the website and play—bargain hunting or just for fun? By effectively combining 
consumers’ utility derived from both entertainment and monetary payoff, we are able to better 
understand their preferences toward specific types of product auctions. Second, we aim to understand 
how consumer learning occurs over time, and how the learning affects their incentives to continually 
participate on the website. In the following sections, we review the relevant literature, describe our 
data, present our model and discuss our findings. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Online auction is a popular selling mechanism used in many e-commerce websites such as eBay. 
Different from traditional fixed price purchase environment, decision dynamics is very complicated in 
online auctions. Because auctions take over time and bidding has a context effect (Simonson 1999), 
consumers may emotionally respond to environmental stimuli during the auction process, such as 
excitement, impulse buying (Adam et al. 2012), escalation of commitment (Malmendier and Lee 2011; 
McGee 2013), strategic late bidding (Caldara 2012), and strategic exit through “Buy-Now” option 
(Angst et al. 2008; Reiner et al. 2014), etc. The decision making complexity makes it challenging to 
fully understand consumers’ behavior in online auctions.  
Because the implementation of pay-to-bid auctions in e-commerce is new, only a small number of 
studies have examined this type of auction from a theoretical perspective. Hinnosaar (2013) shows that 
high variance of outcomes is common for such auction mechanism. Platt et al. (2013) incorporate risk-
loving preferences to explain the excess revenue in the auctions. Byers et al. (2010) show that 
information asymmetries across participants can increase the auction duration and thus produce excess 
profits. Augenblick (2014) considers regret over the past bidding costs. Reiner et al. (2014) analyze 
how the “Buy-Now” feature available on the pay-to-bid auction site helps reduce bidders’ churn rate.  
Most empirical research in online auctions focuses on the traditional types of eBay auction (Bockstedt 
and Goh 2012; Easley et al. 2011). There are only few empirical works on pay-to-bid auctions. Wang 
and Xu (2012) find that such auction websites may lose money to sophisticated participants, but profit 
from most inexperienced bidders who quit quickly after losing some money and realize it is actually 
hard to win the auctions. This suggests that players do learn through repeated participation.  
Prior research shows that learning naturally occurs in various complex decision making environments 
(Dey et al. 2013; Geng et al. 2009). Erdem and Keane (1996) consider consumers’ use experience and 
advertisement as two noisy signals to learn a new product’s attribute. Erdem et al. (2008) further 
incorporate the product price and advertisement frequency to enrich the consumer learning model. In 
the context of targeted marketing, Narayanan and Manchanda (2009) use a Bayesian learning model to 
account for the heterogeneous learning rates of individual physicians for new prescription drugs. 
Iyengar et al. (2007) provide a consumer learning framework to study both service quality and usage 
quantity learning in the service industry. More recently, Zhao et al. (2013) examine how learning 
through readers’ own reading experience and others’ online reviews affect consumer buying behavior. 
Ghose and Han (2011) develop a dynamic structural model of consumer learning to understand user 
content generation and consumption behavior in the mobile channel. Huang et al. (2014) apply the 
structural Bayesian modeling method to analyze consumer learning on a crowdsourcing platform. 
Adding to this line of research, we propose a dynamic structural model with Bayesian learning to 
study consumers’ participation behavior in the entertainment shopping e-commerce environment. 
Various studies in consumer research confirm that shopping experiences can produce both utilitarian 
and hedonic value (Angst et al. 2008; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). Hedonic value refers to the 
enjoyment users derive from the process of participating in the system, apart from its utilitarian values 
that directly related to the shopping outcome (Babin et al. 1994). It is an important design factor in the 
online entertainment community (Liu et al. 2007). Recent research suggests that perceived enjoyment 
is very important in web systems, games, and systems for home and leisure purposes (Van der Heijden 
2004). In the auction environment, Adam et al. (2012) find evidence that consumers derive a hedonic 
value from auction participation that makes exciting auctions more attractive and possibly induces 
bidders to stay active in the auction for a longer period. In our research context, we not only consider 
tangible values such as goods and services acquired, but also examine intangible and emotional costs 
and benefits. We simultaneously account for both hedonic and utilitarian values in consumers’ 
decision making. 
3 DATA 
We collected data from an entertainment shopping website in China. The website sells a large number 
of consumer electronics, as well as other popular products found in typical online retail stores. Our 
data set includes 23,884 auctions from September 26, 2011 to January 21, 2012. During this time 
period, the website provided a relatively stable number of auctions, and attracted a steady stream of 
newly registered users to the site every day. 
Based on the website navigation, we aggregate and classify auctions into three general categories: 
Virtual Products (e.g. top-up cards, bidding tokens etc.), General Merchandise (e.g. home daily 
supplies, electronic appliances etc.) and Digital Products (e.g. tablets, mobile phones etc.). First, we 
separate virtual products from physical products as we believe these two types of products have 
distinct features that might lead to different consumer behavior. Second, we further separate digital 
products from the physical product auctions because digital products are the most popular and most 
profitable. The remaining physical product auctions are included in the General Merchandise category. 
This results in a relatively balanced sample of 5000~7000 auctions in each category.   
The website rewards users in different ways by offering free tokens. For example, new users get free 
tokens upon registration and existing users can earn free tokens by posting pictures of winning 
products and participating in online discussion. The free tokens can be used in free auctions, such as 
the small value top-up card auctions. Because free auctions restrict bidders to use free tokens, rather 
than paid tokens, to place the bids, we treat free auctions separately as the fourth auction type. Overall, 
there are 21,463 auctions provided in the three-month period, among which 3,533 are free auctions. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the three types of paid auctions and free auctions. 
Product Categories 
Virtual 
Products 
General 
Merchandise 
Digital  
Products 
Free  
Auctions 
Total number of auctions 5,488 5,154 7,288 3,533 
Total number of profitable auctions 3,976 1,611 2,431 6 
% of profitable auctions  72.45 31.26 33.36 0.17 
Average retail price / ¥ (s.d.) 50.45(26.42) 220.49(134.84) 442.03(710.70) 31.18(40.00) 
Average ending price / ¥ (s.d.) 2.29(3.26) 2.12(3.32) 7.73(29.65) 5.16(7.30) 
Average duration / minutes (s.d.) 33.35(128.61) 28.31(109.38) 69.35(227.96) 7.30(21.36) 
Average website profit / ¥ (s.d.) 181.17(318.59) -6.66(312.10) 338.54(2550.18) -26.02(38.73) 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Auctions  
We see that Digital Products have higher average retail price, higher auction ending price, longer 
duration, and higher website profit than other categories. Apparently, this category has attracted a lot 
of bidders who contributed significantly to the website revenue. The large average auction ending 
price of Digital Products indicates intense competition in the auctions. Longer auction duration implies 
higher cognitive cost and time cost. Accordingly, a large amount of bidding fees will be sunk, 
resulting in large sunk cost. The large variance indicates that the auction outcomes are highly 
uncertain, which also makes it difficult for users to estimate the auction ending prices and thus infer 
expected payoff from the auctions accurately. Comparing the Virtual Products with General 
Merchandise categories we see that the average auction ending prices and auction duration are similar. 
However, the average retail price for Virtual Products is smaller than that for General Merchandise, 
while the average website profit for Virtual Products is higher than that for General Merchandise. This 
shows that Virtual Products and highly popular Digital Products have higher demand than General 
Merchandise. We believe the website provides auctions for General Merchandise in order to add 
variety of product choices. A wide range of product selection may attract new users to come and 
existing users to revisit the website. 
There are 32,070 active bidders during our observation period. Our data shows that most registered 
users are only active for a very short period of time. It is possible that users who registered early can 
obtain more information than those who registered late. To eliminate such concern, we sample users 
who registered on the same day in our analysis. We randomly select 241 unique users who registered 
on a typical weekday in September 2011. (We have tested other samples in our model robustness 
check.) On one hand, these users have the same prior information set. On the other hand, the 
observation period for the sample users is long enough to reveal users’ learning process. 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total number of auctions 5.89(5.21) 18.66(10.79) 1(1) 822(77) 
Number of paid auctions 4.12(3.36) 16.23(8.43) 0(0) 749(66) 
Number of free auctions 1.78(1.85) 3.53(5.50) 0(0) 150(76) 
Number of winning auctions 0.50(0.33) 2.82(1.39) 0(0) 61(11) 
Number of days the bidder is active 2.24(2.32) 3.56(3.40) 1(1) 69(25) 
Days between first and last bidding 4.53(7.66) 12.14(18.12) 0(0) 91(85) 
Numbers inside the parentheses are for the selected 241 users, and numbers outside the 
parentheses are for all 32,070 users. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Registered Users  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the participation behavior of the sample users. The average 
number of winning auctions is very small, indicating high competition and low probability of winning. 
The mean duration of user participation (the average number of days between the first and last 
participation of a registered user) shows that users only stay active for a few days, which reflects the 
lack of participation on the website. Because the amount of free bidding tokens awarded to or earned 
by each user is limited, the mean and variance of participation in free auctions are relatively smaller 
than the paid auctions.  
4 THE MODEL 
4.1 Utility Function 
Because entertainment effect is a key feature in entertainment shopping, we assess consumers’ 
shopping experience along two important dimensions: utilitarian and hedonic values. As such, we 
incorporate both the perceived non-monetary entertainment value and the expected monetary return in 
the bidder’s utility function. We also consider the risk attitude in the structural model. 
Let 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 be the utility bidder 𝑖 obtained from participating in a category 𝑗 auction on day 𝑡. We define 
the utility function as 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛼𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜 + 𝛼𝑟𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜2 + 𝜆′𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
The first term 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑒  represents the user’s entertainment value through personal experience (denoted by 
the superscript ‘e’). The second term 𝛽𝑗 is auction type-specific, non-monetary entertainment effect. 
The third term 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜  captures the effect of auction competition by observed auction price signals 
(denoted by the superscript ‘o’). The fourth squared term 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜2 measures the bidder’s risk preferences in 
response to auction competition. The fifth term 𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a vector of bidder and time-specific covariates. 
In the following, we describe each term in the utility function in detail. 
Because 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑒  is the website entertainment value bidder 𝑖 experienced at time 𝑡, it reflects the bidder’s 
overall evaluation of the entertainment shopping environment. The auction rules, the number of 
products and variety of product selection, the shopping convenience, and other aspects of the website 
design may affect the website entertainment value. We assume each registered user derives his own 
entertainment value from the entertainment shopping site with its true mean drawn from a normal 
distribution. Initially the user has a prior belief about his entertainment value. After participating in an 
auction, the user updates his belief about the entertainment value based on his own in-auction 
experience. If the user has participated sufficient number of auctions on the website, he will eventually 
learn the true entertainment value the website brings to him. We will present the detailed 
entertainment belief update process in the next section.  
In addition to the general website entertainment value a bidder perceives, different types of auctions 
may bring different entertainment experiences to users. For example, the auction for virtual products 
such as the top-up telephone cards can be immediately cashed out upon winning. Unlike other physical 
products that have to be shipped to the winners, immediate gratification of the virtual products may 
bring high excitement for bidders in this type of auctions. One the other hand, an auction for popular 
digital products such as iPhone may take hours, even a day, to complete, so it incurs high time cost 
and cognitive cost for the bidders. We thus use 𝛽𝑗 to denote the auction type-specific entertainment 
value, where a positive value can be understood as the non-monetary, psychological benefit and a 
negative value the participation cost incurred in different types of auctions.  
Bidders may infer the level of competition from the observed historical auction ending prices. The 
mean auction ending price represents the expected return, and the variance of the auction ending price 
captures the uncertainty involved in the expected return. Because 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜  denotes the mean ending price 
of type 𝑗 auctions observed by bidder 𝑖 on day 𝑡, we focus on auction ending prices at category level 
rather than individual auction level. The reason for this modelling choice is that we are mainly 
interested in understanding the bidders’ participation in different types of auctions instead of any 
individual auctions. The parameter 𝛼 is the coefficient measuring the effect of the expected monetary 
return, and 𝑟 captures bidders’ risk preference toward uncertainty in the auction outcome.  
Finally, 𝑆𝑖𝑡  contains bidder- and time- specific covariates, including the bidder’s earning in the 
previous period, his cumulative wealth up to time 𝑡, and a loss indicator capturing his continuous 
auction failures. The parameter vector 𝜆  is used to measure how the covariates affect the utility. 
Finally, the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , which is unobservable to the researcher but is known to the bidders, 
captures the bidder choice-specific random shock in period 𝑡. For example, these errors can be any 
promotion activities or reminder emails that are unknown to researchers but can influence bidders’ 
choice of participation. 
4.2 Learning of Entertainment Value 
We assume that bidders have a prior belief 𝐸𝑖0 for the entertainment value when they first register on 
the website. The prior belief is normally distributed with mean 𝐸0 and variance 𝜎𝐸0
2  as 
 𝐸𝑖0~𝑁(𝐸0, 𝜎𝐸0
2 ). (2) 
After registration, bidders can access to both free and paid auctions provided by the website. Bidders 
learn the entertainment value through experiencing both types of auctions. We hypothesize that the 
free auction experience signal is more precise than the paid auction signals, because the free auction 
does not involve real money bidding, which helps quickly discover the true entertainment value a 
bidder can enjoy from participating in the auctions. 
Let 𝜇 denote the true mean entertainment value, we define bidder 𝑖’s direct experience through the 𝑠𝑡ℎ 
paid auction and 𝑚𝑡ℎ free auction on day 𝑡 as 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑝 = 𝜇 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝑠, where 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛿
2), and 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑚
𝑓 = 𝜇 +
𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑚 , where 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑚~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂
2) , respectively. Here 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝑠 and 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑚 measure the deviation of bidder 𝑖 ’s 
received entertainment signal at time 𝑡 from the true mean entertainment value, and 𝜎𝛿
2and 𝜎𝜂
2are 
bidding experience variances, which measure the precision of signals. Accordingly, bidder 𝑖 receives 
the experience signal only when he bids in one auction, and the signals follow a Normal distribution: 
𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑝 ~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝛿
2), and 𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑚
𝑓 ~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝜂
2). 
Assume bidder 𝑖 participates in a total of 𝑛𝑖𝑡 paid auctions and 𝑓𝑖𝑡 free auctions on day 𝑡. The series of 
observed signals can be aggregated, which have the following Normal distributions respectively: 
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑝 =
∑ 𝐸
𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑝
𝑠
𝑛𝑖𝑡
~𝑁 (𝜇,
𝜎𝛿
2
𝑛𝑖𝑡
),  and 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑓 =
∑ 𝐸
𝑖𝑡𝑚
𝑓
𝑚
𝑓𝑖𝑡
~𝑁 (𝜇,
𝜎𝜂
2
𝑓𝑖𝑡
).  Conditional on the signals obtained on day 𝑡 , 
bidders update their posterior belief according to the Bayes’ theorem (DeGroot 1970) as follows: 
 𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝐸 (𝜇) = 𝑁(𝐸𝑖𝑡 , 𝜎𝐸𝑖𝑡
2 ), (3) 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
𝜎𝐸𝑖𝑡
2
𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
2 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝐸𝑖𝑡
2
𝜎𝛿
2 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑝 + 𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝐸𝑖𝑡
2
𝜎𝜂
2 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑓 , and 𝜎𝐸𝑖𝑡
2 = 1
1 𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
2⁄ +𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝜎𝛿
2⁄ +𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝜎𝜂
2⁄
.  Here 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
mean and 𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
2  is the variance of the entertainment belief at the beginning of day 𝑡, which are the 
same as the posterior ones at the end of day 𝑡 − 1. The prior belief on day 1 is specified as 𝐸𝑖0 = 𝐸0 
and 𝜎𝐸𝑖0
2 = 𝜎𝐸0
2 . Based on the Bayesian update, bidders place a relatively higher weight on more 
precise signals (i.e., the signals with a lower variance).  
4.3 Learning of Auction Ending Prices 
Based on the auction rules, the higher the ending price for an auction, the lower the expected revenue 
(which equals to the retail price subtracts the auction ending price), and thus the more intense the 
competition. Because the retail prices are fixed on the website, consumers observe the historical 
auction ending prices as proxy signals based on which they form expectations about the monetary 
return for different types of auctions. Simple regression reveals that the number of bidders is 
significantly and positively correlated (p-value < 0.01) with the auction ending price for all three types.  
We assume that bidders have a prior belief for the average auction ending price when they joined the 
website: 𝑃𝑖𝑗0~𝑁(𝑃0𝑗, 𝜎𝑃0
2 ), where 𝑃0𝑗  is the prior mean and 𝜎𝑃0
2  is the prior variance. This can be 
obtained by historical price information available on the website. In addition, bidders update their 
beliefs about future auction ending prices as new auctions are completed on the website. We assume 
that bidders update their ending price beliefs on a daily basis. All auctions’ ending prices for a specific 
type are aggregated into one signal as 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜 = 𝑃𝑗 + 𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑡 , where 𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜁𝑗
2 ) and 𝜎𝜁𝑗
2  is the ending 
price variance for type 𝑗  auctions. Thus, the observed ending price signal can be expressed as 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜 ~𝑁(𝑃𝑗 , 𝜎𝜁𝑗
2 ). Conditional on the daily ending price signals obtained, bidders update their posterior 
belief accordingly: 
 𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑂(𝑃𝑗) = 𝑁(𝑃𝑗𝑡 , 𝜎𝑃𝑗𝑡
2 ), (4) 
where 𝑃𝑗𝑡 =
𝜎𝑃𝑗𝑡
2
𝜎𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1
2 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝜎𝑃𝑗𝑡
2
𝜎𝜁𝑗
2 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜  and 𝜎𝑃𝑗𝑡
2 = 1
1 𝜎𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1
2⁄ +1 𝜎𝜁𝑗
2⁄
. Here 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 is the mean and 𝜎𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1
2  is the 
variance of the prior ending price belief for type 𝑗 auctions at the beginning of day 𝑡, which is the 
same as the posterior belief at the end of day 𝑡 − 1 . Considering the significant ending prices 
differences among three types, we specify the type-specific ending price prior beliefs as 𝑃𝑖𝑗0 = 𝑃0𝑗 
and 𝜎𝑃𝑗0
2 = 𝜎𝑃0
2 . 
4.4 Monetary Gain and Continuous Loss 
In the utility function, we define 𝑆𝑖𝑡 as a vector of bidder- and time-specific covariates. We include 
such monetary terms as the bidder’s earning in the last period 𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑙  and his cumulative wealth up to 
time 𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑐 . The last period earning is calculated as the total revenue (retail prices minus auction 
ending prices for winners and zero for losers) subtracts sunk cost in the previous day. The cumulative 
wealth is the bidder’s account balance at time 𝑡 . We take the log transformation of the revenue 
(similarly, for sunk cost and cumulative balance) plus 1 to rescale the measure and to avoid infinitely 
negative values. 
We also include a continuous loss factor. Escalation of commitment (Staw 1976) and sunk cost fallacy 
have been used to justify people’s increased investment such as money and time in a decision. In the 
pay-to-bid auction games, bidders incur some sunk costs (the non-negligible biddings fees) each time 
they lose an auction. In order to evaluate whether the bidder may make poor decisions by using past 
failures to justify continued involvement, we use a loss indicator 𝐿𝑖𝑡 to indicate whether the bidder has 
lost a fixed number of auctions continuously or not. For example, if the bidder loses 15 auctions 
continuously, then the indicator is 1, otherwise it is 0. A significant and positive estimate of the 
coefficient for 𝐿𝑖𝑡  will confirm escalation of commitment. The values for 𝑀𝑖1
𝑙 , 𝑀𝑖1
𝑐  and 𝐿𝑖1  at the 
beginning of day 1 are all specified as zero. 
4.5 Expected Utility and Likelihood 
Bidders make bidding decisions based on their expected utilities. Bidder 𝑖 holds an information set 𝐼𝑖𝑡 
containing all received auction-related signals up to day 𝑡. Conditional on the information set, the 
expected utility for bidder 𝑖 from bidding in type 𝑗 auctions at time 𝑡 is  
 𝐸[𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝐼𝑖𝑡] = ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, (5) 
where 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐸[𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑒 |𝐼𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛼𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜 |𝐼𝑖𝑡] + 𝛼𝑟𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜2|𝐼𝑖𝑡] + 𝜆
′𝐸[𝑆𝑖𝑡|𝐼𝑖𝑡].  (6) 
For the entertainment value, we have 𝐸[𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑒 |𝐼𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸[𝜇|𝐼𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1. Similarly, the expected ending 
price is 𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜 |𝐼𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑃𝑗|𝐼𝑖𝑡] = 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1. Furthermore, we can write 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜 = 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 + (𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑡 
and derive the conditional expectation 𝐸[𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑜2|𝐼𝑖𝑡] = 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1
2 + [(𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1)
2|𝐼𝑖𝑡] + 𝜎𝜁𝑗
2 . Therefore, the 
conditional expected utility for bidder 𝑖 is expressed as:  
𝐸[𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝐼𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛼𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑟𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼𝑟𝐸[(𝑃𝑗 − 𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1)
2|𝐼𝑖𝑡] + 𝛼𝑟𝜎𝜁𝑗
2 + 𝜆1𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑙 + 𝜆2𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑐 +
𝜆3𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 .  (7) 
Bidders’ participation probability for a specific auction type is based on the bidders’ expected utility. 
We assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 follows a Type I extreme value distribution. The probability of observing bidders’ 
bidding action 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 can be specified as 
 𝑃𝑟(𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) = (
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡)
)𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡( 1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡)
)(1−𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡). (8) 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes bidder 𝑖’s participation variable, which equals 1 if bidder 𝑖 bids in type 𝑗 auctions 
at time 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. We further assume that bidders’ bidding decision for each type of auctions 
is independent. The joint likelihood for the sample bidders’ bidding series can be specified as 
 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝐴) = ∏ ∏ ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 . (9) 
where 𝐴  is the bidding decisions matrix for all 𝑁  bidders for 𝐽  types of auctions over the entire 
observation period 𝑇. 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The likelihood function in Equation (9) is jointly determined by the perceived entertainment effect and 
the perceived auction ending prices, means and variances, and bidder- and time-specific covariates in 
each time period. Although the ending price signals can be observed, the entertainment signals through 
bidding are unobservable. From the researcher’s point of view, we only know the distribution of the 
signals. Considering the infeasibility of high dimensional integration for the likelihood function in 
closed form, we use simulated maximum likelihood (McFadden 1989) as an approximation method to 
compute the likelihood function.  
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results. The three 𝛽 values are negative, which reflect the average 
cognitive cost for bidders to participate in a specific type of auction. We see that the absolute values 
for Type 1 (Virtual Products, 4.930) and Type 2 (General Merchandises, fixed at 5) are smaller than 
the Type 3 (Digital Products, 6.307) auctions. This seems reasonable because the average durations for 
Type 1 and Type 2 auctions are relatively short and auctions usually end very quickly from a few 
minutes to a few hours. But Type 3 products generally have higher retail prices and bidders who 
participate in such auctions may persist for a long time. For example, the popular Apple product 
auctions may last for more than one day, pausing at 00:00 am and restarting at 9:00 am. The time cost 
and cognitive cost associated with this type of auctions are higher than other types of auctions. 
The entertainment value measures the average overall effect of the entertainment shopping 
environment on bidders’ utility, such as the bidders’ general attitude toward enjoyment of playing the 
online auction games. The prior entertainment belief 𝐸0 (6.935) is significantly higher than the true 
mean entertainment value we estimated (4.677). It indicates that bidders overestimate the 
entertainment benefit they can obtain at the beginning of an auction they participate. Recall that 
bidders experience the entertainment effect by their own participation in both paid and free auctions. 
The results show that the natural logarithm variance for the free auctions (1.541) is smaller than that 
from the paid auctions (5.216). Thus, the signal from free auctions is more precise because bidders 
have no monetary sunk cost for free auctions and can obtain more accurate entertainment valuation 
through participating in free auctions. 
 
Parameters Estimates Std. Error 
𝛽1 Type 1 (Virtual Products) auction cognitive cost -4.930 0.155*** 
𝛽2 Type 2 (General Merchandise) auction cognitive cost -5 -Fixed 
𝛽3 Type 3 (Digital Products) auction cognitive cost -6.307 0.616*** 
𝜇 Mean website entertainment value 4.677 0.625*** 
𝛼 Sensitivity to auction competition -4.219 0.384*** 
𝑟 Risk preference -0.071 0.002*** 
𝜆1 Past monetary gain -0.455 0.049*** 
𝜆2 Cumulative monetary gain 0.307 0.057*** 
𝜆3 Continuous bidding loss 0.796 0.394** 
𝐸0 Prior belief about website entertainment value 6.935 0.563*** 
𝜎𝐸0
2  Variance of prior belief about entertainment value 10 -Fixed 
𝑙𝑛𝜎𝛿
2 Log variance of paid auction participation signal 5.216 0.296*** 
𝑙𝑛𝜎𝜂
2 Log variance of free auction participation signal 1.541 0.160*** 
𝑃01 Prior belief for Type 1 auction ending price 1.814 0.101*** 
𝑃02 Prior belief for Type 2 auction ending price 1.831 0.108*** 
𝑃03 Prior belief for Type 3 auction ending price 5.462 0.392*** 
𝜎𝑃0
2  Variance of prior belief about auction ending price 10 -Fixed 
𝑃1 Mean ending price for Type 1 auction 2.346 0.070*** 
𝑃2 Mean ending price for Type 2 auction 2.195 0.061*** 
𝑃3 Mean ending price for Type 3 auction 8.441 0.556*** 
𝑙𝑛𝜎𝜁1
2  Log variance of Type 1 auction ending price signal  -0.799 0.147*** 
𝑙𝑛𝜎𝜁2
2  Log variance of Type 2 auction ending price signal -1.064 0.147*** 
𝑙𝑛𝜎𝜁3
2  Log variance of Type 3 auction ending price signal 3.371 0.147*** 
Note: *** denotes significant at 0.01; ** denotes significant at 0.05. 
Table 3. Parameter Estimation 
We see that the initial ending price beliefs are 1.814, 1.831 and 5.462, which are smaller than the true 
means, 2.346, 2.195 and 8.441, respectively. This indicates that bidders underestimate the auction 
ending prices for all three types of auctions. Bidders’ overestimation of entertainment value and 
underestimation of auction competition together explain the observation that many bidders participate 
in a lot of auctions at the beginning and then the number of participated auctions decreases over time. 
As to the auction ending price signal precisions, Type 1 and Type 2 auctions show more precise 
signals as the natural logarithm of variances are very small (-0.799 and -1.064). However, the signals’ 
variance for Type 3 auctions is relatively large (the natural logarithm of variance is 3.371). These 
results suggest that learning of the auction ending price in Type 3 auctions is more difficult than 
learning in the first two types of auctions. 
The parameter 𝛼 for the perceived auction ending price is negative (-4.219). It indicates that auctions 
with higher ending price may reduce bidder’s utility, which leads to a lower participation probability. 
This is intuitive because higher auction ending price implies intense competition in the auction, which 
reduces bidders’ incentive to participate in the auction. However, the risk preference parameter 𝑟 is 
also negative (-0.071). Together with the negative value of 𝛼, we conclude that bidders show risk-
seeking preference.  
The parameter for bidders’ past gain is negative (-0.455). While a loss in the recent past increases the 
probability of participation in the next time period, a win in the recent past reduces the participation 
interest in the following time period. Therefore, the payoff in the previous time period has a negative 
impact on utility. 
In contrast, the effect of cumulative balance on utility is positive (0.307). It implies that losing too 
much money cumulatively on the entertainment shopping website has a large negative effect on the 
utility and bidders may quit the website without bidding anymore. On the other hand, there may be 
few game-addicted bidders. The coefficient for the continuous loss indicator is positive (0.796), which 
is statistically significant at 0.05 level. In our estimation, we set the threshold for continuous auction 
loss at 15, which is relatively a large number. The positive coefficient indicates that bidders become 
more addicted after losing many auctions, reflecting the gambling effect inherent in the entertainment 
shopping mechanism. This is consistent with the prior findings on escalation of commitment that has 
been widely discussed in the psychology literature on lottery and gambling.  
6 POLICY SIMULATIONS 
A key advantage of structural model is to allow for counterfactual analyses. We conduct a set of policy 
experiments aiming to provide business insights and marketing strategies for building a more 
sustainable business model. For all simulations, we evaluate each policy change by making 2000 
iterations using the estimated parameters. We then use the average performance measures to assess the 
effects of policy changes. 
6.1 Entertainment Value 
A lot of entertainment shopping websites go bankrupt after a short period of operation. The problem is 
the quickly decreasing rate of active users. Because consumers have to pay for the “fun” each time 
they place a bid on the website, the website needs to find ways to improve the overall consumer 
experience in the entertainment shopping environment. For example, bidders incur high cognitive cost 
during the last 10-second bidding wars. Automatic bidding can dramatically lower the cognitive load 
and the monitoring cost of the bidders, thus increase bidder utilities. The website may consider 
providing automatic bidding tools to allow bidders to customize their bidding strategies. In addition, 
the website can provide more auctions in the Virtual Product category where the auction-specific 
cognitive participation cost is the lowest. All these efforts will help increase the participation rates.  
Our simulation procedure is to increase the true entertainment value 𝜇 by 20% (50%) while other 
parameters remain the same as the estimated values. Hence, the entertainment signals obtained 
through participating in paid and free auctions follow the Normal distributions with changed means. 
Table 4 reports the percentage of active bidders on different days after registration when we increase 
the mean entertainment value by 20% and 50%, respectively. Because bidders’ participation on the 
registration day is based on their prior entertainment beliefs, there is no significant change on the first 
day. During the following days, the percentage of daily active bidders for all three types of auctions 
increases. For example, comparing with the current level 0.25%, the percentage of active bidders for 
Digital Products (Type 3) on day 11 increases to 0.32% (0.56%) if the mean entertainment value 
improves by 20% (50%). There is a large increase in the percentage of bidders’ participation in the 
first month. The percentage of active bidders on day 91 when the mean entertainment value increases 
50% is 0.28%, significantly higher than the current level 0.12%. The results clearly show that more 
bidders will stay active after the policy change. 
Active Bidder Percentage Day 1 Day 11 Day 21 Day 31 Day 61 Day 91 
Type 1: Virtual Products 
Current Policy 17.56% 0.81% 0.56% 0.31% 0.08% 0.04% 
Ent. Value increased by 20% 17.66% 1.02% 0.75% 0.42% 0.11% 0.06% 
Ent. Value increased by 50% 17.62% 1.67% 1.22% 0.64% 0.17% 0.09% 
Type 2: General Merchandise 
Current Policy 15.44% 0.35% 0.15% 0.10% 0.08% 0.05% 
Ent. Value increased by 20% 15.52% 0.45% 0.20% 0.16% 0.11% 0.07% 
Ent. Value increased by 50% 15.49% 0.76% 0.32% 0.23% 0.17% 0.11% 
Type 3: Digital Products 
Current Policy 13.87% 0.25% 0.26% 0.31% 0.10% 0.12% 
Ent. Value increased by 20% 13.97% 0.32% 0.35% 0.42% 0.12% 0.18% 
Ent. Value increased by 50% 13.92% 0.56% 0.58% 0.64% 0.20% 0.28% 
Table 4. Percentages of Active Bidders by Increasing the Mean Entertainment Value 
6.2 Bidder Learning 
Our base model results show that initially bidders overestimate the entertainment value. They update 
their beliefs about the entertainment value after participating in some auctions. Therefore, offering 
newly registered bidders with free bidding tokens would enable them to participate in more free 
auctions, which helps them to quickly discover the true entertainment value and lower their bidding 
utility. This may have a negative revenue impact on the website. Table 5 shows that removing free 
auctions can help increase the expected percentage of active bidders on the website. The policy 
simulation suggests that alternative strategies, such as offering discounted paid bidding tokens (e.g., 
bidding token with a discounted prices) rather than free bidding tokens, should be provided to bidders 
at the time of registration.  
Active Bidder Percentage Day 1 Day 11 Day 21 Day 31 Day 61 Day 91 
Type 1: Virtual Products 
Current Policy 17.56% 0.81% 0.56% 0.31% 0.08% 0.04% 
No Free Auction Training 17.66% 2.01% 1.47% 0.85% 0.22% 0.11% 
Type 2: General Merchandise 
Current Policy 15.44% 0.35% 0.15% 0.10% 0.08% 0.05% 
No Free Auction Training 15.52% 0.88% 0.38% 0.31% 0.22% 0.16% 
Type 3: Digital Products 
Current Policy 13.87% 0.25% 0.26% 0.31% 0.10% 0.12% 
No Free Auction Training 13.97% 0.63% 0.69% 0.84% 0.25% 0.41% 
Table 5. Percentages of Active Bidders by Removing Free Auctions Training 
7 CONCLUSION 
The recent proliferation of many entertainment shopping websites worldwide has attracted both 
consumers and businesses.  Despite the huge revenue potential, a lot of websites have ceased operation 
in a short period of time, casting doubt on the entertainment shopping concept and sustainability of its 
business model. This study proposes a dynamic structural model to understand consumers’ 
participation behavior on such a website. We conduct policy simulations to evaluate the potential 
impact on consumer participation. We offer several policy recommendations to increase consumers’ 
lifetime value on the website. 
Specifically, our model captures consumers learning from both their own participation experience and 
observational learning on the website. We find that both types of learnings are important to influence 
consumers’ participation behavior. In particular, consumers significantly overestimate the 
entertainment value but underestimate the level of competition at the beginning of their participation, 
which explain the observed decreasing participation rate over time. We further find that consumers 
generally show risk-seeking preferences. Some heavily-addicted users are more willing to participate 
in new auctions after experiencing continuous and significant loss. We find evidence of escalation of 
commitment from these heavily-addicted bidders.  
Through counterfactual policy simulations, we have discussed several website design implications to 
create a more sustainable business model. First, we recommend the website to use automatic bidding 
tools to increase user experiences. Second, the website can influence consumer learning by reforming 
the free auction mechanism and free bidding token reward policies. Our policy simulation results 
indicate that these changes can induce users to stay active for a longer time. This is important for the 
online entertainment shopping websites to retain consumers. 
Our current model has several limitations. First, because our focus is on consumers’ learning across 
different bidding games, we do not incorporate consumers’ in-game experience. That is, we do not 
explicitly model consumers’ bidding strategies in each stage of the auction bidding game. A possible 
future direction is to build a micro-level behavior model to study consumers’ bidding strategies. 
Second, consumers are heterogeneous in nature. They may have different budget constraint, risk 
attitude, and shopping interests. Because we do not have access to consumer characteristics data, our 
model cannot capture such heterogeneity. Future research may use survey and lab experiments to 
collect such behavior data. An enriched model can offer more valuable insights that are unavailable 
from this study. Finally, we consider the consumer’s participation decision as a myopic decision 
problem based on the consumer’s current information set, his belief about the entertainment value and 
perception about auction competition. Future research may build a dynamic optimization model to 
study consumers’ forward-looking behavior in managing a portfolio of their auction participations 
subject to their own budget constraints.  
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